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School Student Dress and Appearance Regulations
Marvin R. Plasco*
U NTIL RECENTLY, the general public and the legal profession have had
little concern about the civil rights of the individual student in our
public educational system. The student has been forced to fight his own
battle against school regulations and penalties and the procedures by
which these regulations have been enforced. The result often has been
the loss of some of his personal freedoms.
The right of the public school system to establish dress and ap-
pearance regulations, and the right of the student to dress as he de-
sires, have brought the conflict to the foreground. The student wants
the benefit of a public education without sacrificing his personal and
political beliefs.' To attain his freedom he often defies authority. The
school's interests are in efficient, effective and orderly conduct of the
public school system.2 Conformity, discipline, and the enforcement of
moral and political values are said to be the primary concerns.
3
Student Regulations
Although case law on this subject is inconsistent and not well de-
veloped, litigation between students and schools is increasing. As a
general rule courts have upheld school regulations unless they are ar-
bitrary or unreasonable. 4 Such rulings have given local boards of edu-
cation wide discretionary powers without fear of court intervention.
5
* B.S., Miami Univ. (Ohio); Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School;
Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) County Welfare agent.
1 Rothwax, The Rights of Public School Students, in, Course on Law and Poverty:
The Minor, 2.01 Ohio State Legal Services Association (1968).
2 Ibid.
3 Id.
4 Holroyd v. Eibling, 116 Ohio App. 440, 188 N.E.2d 797 (1962). See also, Ohio Rev.
Code § 3313.20 (Supp. 1967), which provides, in part:
The board of education shall make such rules and regulations as are necessary
for its government and the government of its employees, pupils of its schools,
and all other persons entering upon its school grounds or premises.
5 State v. Chamberlain, 39 Ohio Op.2d 262, 175 N.E.2d 539 (C.P. 1961) which upheld
a local school board's regulation requiring pregnant students to withdraw from
school. The court said that the school board could not prohibit attendance solely on
the basis of marriage, but that here attendance was denied in the interest of a
student's physical well-being and not as a punitive measure. The court said that
after the birth of the child the student could return to school; and see, Mosely v.
City of Dallas, 118 Tex. 461, 17 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). Here a Texas court
said that judgments of school authorities on how to create a proper school environ-
ment should not be set aside, unless there is a clear abuse of their discretion, or a
violation of the law; where there is no such abuse, the law will not substitute the
discretion of the courts for that of the board.
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Suspension of a student for disobedience is within this power.6 For
example, Jones v. Day7 upheld a regulation adopted by an agricultural
high school which required the wearing of a khaki uniform by all male
students attending school.
In Stromberg v. French8 the court upheld the reasonableness of
a rule prohibiting male students from wearing metal heel plates on
their shoes. The court stated that sometimes the interests of the public
are paramount to the rights of individual students; the regulation in
question was clearly exercised in good faith, for the maintenance of good
order and discipline in the classroom. Compare this with Byrd v. Gary,9
which upheld the suspension of students for violating an instruction
against attempting to organize a student boycott of food served by the
school in its cafeteria.
Membership in high school fraternities and sororities is another area
over which school authorities have almost complete control.1 0 Wilson
v. Abilene Independent School District" upheld the action of a school,
prohibiting students from becoming members of high school fraternities
and sororities. The Texas court said:
The Superintendent, a principal and board of trustees of a public
free school, to a limited extent at least, stand, as to the pupils attend-
ing the school, in loco parentis, and they may exercise such powers
of control, restraint as are necessary to enable teachers to perform
their duties and to effect the general purposes of education. The
courts will not interfere in such matters unless a clear abuse of
power and discretion is made to appear.12
When dealing with school regulations on student marriage or
pregnancy, however, the courts have been inconsistent. Generally, courts
will not uphold a school regulation permanently excluding a student
from public schools solely on the basis of his marriage. 13 In Anderson
6 In Ohio, it has long been recognized that boards of education are authorized by
law to suspend pupils for disobedience of rules and regulations of the board, barring
a reasonable excuse. Sewell v. Board of Education, 29 Ohio St. 89 (1876); accord,
Roe v. Deming, 21 Ohio St. 666 (1871). See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3313.66 and 3313.44,
which provide Ohio public schools with the statutory authority to suspend or expel
pupils.
7 127 Miss. 136, 89 So. 906 (1921).
8 60 N.D. 750, 236 N.W. 477 (1931).
9 184 F.Supp. 388 (E.D. So. Car. 1960). The court held that the discretionary action
taken by the school officials was not a violation of the student's constitutional or
civil rights.
10 Smith v. Board of Education, 182 Ill. App. 342 (1913). See also, Waugh v. Board
of Trustees of University of Mississippi, 237 U.S. 589 (1915), here the court found
that a state college also has the right to restrict affiliations with fraternities and
sororities.
11 190 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
12 Id. at 410. In Ohio membership in public school fraternities and sororities is
prohibited by statute. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.35.
13 Nutt v. Board of Education of Goodland, 128 Kans. 507 (1929).
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v. Canyon Independent School District,14 the court struck down a regu-
lation which stated that all students who marry during the school
term must withdraw for the remainder of the school year. The court
held that the school board was not empowered to adopt such a rule, and
based its decision mainly on the compulsory attendance laws of Texas. 15
Almost ten years earlier, a Tennessee court had held exactly opposite
in a similar situation.1 6
However, in Board of Directors of the Independent School District
of Waterloo v. Green,17 the court, in upholding a school regulation ex-
cluding married pupils from participation in extracurricular activities,
found that such a rule was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Thus,
although married students cannot be permanently excluded without
cause, school authorities may place limitations upon their activities with-
in the school setting. Pregnant students have not done as well in the
courts; they must withdraw from school until after the birth of the
child, at which time they may return.1 8 The argument is that such a
regulation is in the interest of a student's physical well-being and is not
a punitive measure. 19
The above illustrate only a few of the many restrictions which
school administrators have successfully placed upon public school
students. Other areas where the courts have ruled in favor of the
school system include regulating the student's right to park his car and
remove it during lunch hour,20 his right to leave the school grounds
during noon hour,21 and his right to eat the food he desires.22
Personal Appearance
We exist today in a world of Carnaby Street clothes, fishnet stock-
ings, Beatle haircuts, mini-skirts, Nehru jackets, and midi-skirts. Prob-
14 412 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (writ of Mandamus adjudicated).
15 Id. at 390. The student in question was under seventeen and thus within the
statutory Texas age limit requiring admission of all students under twenty-one
years of age.
16 Thompson v. Marion County Board of Education, 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57
(1957) upheld a similar regulation as in Anderson, as being neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable. The court said that the first few months after marriage the student
could have a "disruptive effect" on the other pupils.
17 147 N.W.2d 854, 860 (1967); accord, Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op.2d 223, 189
N.E.2d 181 (1962); Kissick v. Garland Independent School District, 330 S.W.2d 708
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
18 State v. Chamberlain, supra note 5.
19 Id. The court also discussed the so called "disruptive effect" that a pregnant
student might have .on the other pupils.
20 McLean Independent School District v. Andrews, 333 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960).
21 Bozeman v. Morrow, 34 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
22 Bishop v. Houston Independent School District, 119 Tex. 403, 29 S.W.2d 312 (1930).
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lems of student appearance and style, as they were treated in the past
are no longer analogous to the problems which face us today. 23 In 1923,
for example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the right of a school
principal to refuse admission to a girl because of a school regulation
against talcum powder. 24 The court said:
The wearing of transparent hosiery, low-necked dresses, or any style
of clothes tending toward immodesty in dress, or in the use of face
paint or cosmetics, is prohibited. 25
The School's Contention
One of the leading cases involving rules about the length and style
of an individual student's hair is Leonard v. School Committee of Attle-
boro.2 1 In Leonard the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld a school
regulation which barred students with unacceptable haircuts from at-
tending high school. As in most cases of conflict between an individual
student's views, and a school regulation, the court held that the school
regulation must be arbitrary or unreasonable before it would be over-
ruled.2 7
In this case, the plaintiff was a high school senior who had been
suspended from classes after only two days of the school term, due to
his "unacceptable" hair style. Previous to this incident, the school of-
ficials described him as a model student. The student argued that he
was a professional musician and that his hair style was an important
factor in his success. 28 In addition, he claimed that the regulation in
question had not been formally adopted and published. He argued that
it was unenforceable. The court, in rejecting these arguments, said:
The law, however, does not thus restrict the manner in which a
school committee, school administrators, or teachers shall maintain
discipline and decorum in the classroom.29
23 Martin, The Right To Dress And Go To School, 37 Univ. of Col. L. Rev. 492 (1965).
24 Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923) (hereinafter cited as
Pugsley).
25 Id. However, thirty-nine years later a school principal had almost the opposite
problem. A young girl refused to participate in a school's physical education pro-
gram because the costume prescribed for students and certain physical exercises
required were immodest and sinful, according to her religious beliefs. The court
denied relief and held that the State of Alabama could place reasonable conditions
upon the privilege of attending public school. Mitchell v. McCall, 273 Ala. 604, 143
So.2d 629 (1962).
26 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Leonard).
27 Id at 471. The court said:
Thus a school committee may make reasonable rules and regulations for the
discipline, management, and government of the schools, and may exclude a child
from school for sufficient cause.
28 The facts indicate that since the age of twelve, plaintiff has been a professional
musician. He is proficient in playing several instruments and has successfully per-
formed at the Newport Jazz Festival and at the New York World's Fair.
29 Leonard, supra note 26 at 472; accord, Hodgkins v. Inhabitants of Rockport, 105
Mass. 475, 476 (1870).
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School regulations, the court continued, are essential. Without such con-
trol, administrators and teachers would be unable to cope with problems
of student management and discipline.30
Plaintiff-student then argued that the restriction on his hair op-
erated beyond the school's jurisdiction, and was an invasion of his family
privacy rights, which are within the exclusive control of his parents.
However, the court said:
The domain of family privacy must give way in so far as a regula-
tion reasonably calculated to maintain school discipline may affect
it. The rights of other students, and the interests of teachers, ad-
ministrators and the community at large in a well run and eficient
school system are paramount. 31 (Emphasis added.)
Holding that the regulation was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and
was essential for the successful operation of the school, the court stated:
... any unusual, immodest or exaggerated mode of dress, con-
spicuous departures from accepted customs in the matter of haircuts
could result in the distraction of other pupils.
... (and thus) disrupt and impede the maintenance of proper class-
room atmosphere or decorum.3 2
In Marshall v. Oliver,3 3 the court upheld the right of the Richmond
Professional Institute to deny admission to three college students be-
cause of the length and style of their hair and beards. The Circuit Court
held that educational regulations must be arbitrary or unreasonable
if they are to be struck down.34 Again, the general rule was advanced.
The court further stated that university or college authorities stand
in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral welfare and mental
training of their students.35
The court added that it would not interfere with the exercise of the
discretion of such authorities unless the rules and purposes were un-
authorized. 3r The court concluded that it was of the opinion that the au-
thorities:
. . . clearly dictate a distinction between the freedom to believe,
which is absolute, and our freedom to exercise one's belief, which is
subject to regulation for the protection of society.37
30 Leonard, supra note 26 at 472.
31 Id. at 473.
32 Id. at 473. In reaching this important conclusion, the court cited the 1923 case of
Pugsley, which upheld a school regulation against the use of talcum powder.
33 In, Brief for Appellee at Appendix A-1, Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dis-
trict, No. 24301 (5th Cir., March 29, 1968).
34 Id. at A-5.
35 Id.
36 Id. at A-6.
37 Id. at A-7.
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Another case involving male hair styles and school regulations is
that of Ferrel v. Dallas Independent School District.38 In Ferrel, the
court held that the suspension of the students involved was neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable, and did not violate the students' State or
Federal rights.3 9 Discussing the possible disruptive effect a student's
dress and appearance might have on the other pupils, the court said:
Since confusion and anarchy have no place in the classroom, school
authorities must control the behavior of their students. If the stu-
dent's dress is lewd or his appearance is a studied effort to draw
attention to himself, his presence is disruptive-such behavior is no
different than verbal rudeness. 40
The court continued, saying that either the school principal or the ad-
ministrators could exercise powers of control and correction over the
pupils, as might be "reasonably necessary to enable teachers to perform
their duties and to effect the general purpose of the educational sys-
tem." 41
Citing Leonard, the court said that although it was concerned with
the welfare of the individual students, "the rights of other students and
the interests of educators and the community at large were para-
mount." 42
In concluding its opinion, the court expressed the view that society
expects more from our public education than just teaching the 3 R's
to our students. 4 3 The court said:
One of the aims of the school should be to educate the individual
to live successfully with other people in our democracy. Since
school authorities, by legislative grant, control the public educa-
tion system, their regulations play a part in the education process.44
Davis v. Firment,45 represents another recent decision upholding
the power of school authorities to establish dress and appearance regu-
lations. In Davis, the district court found that a high school student has
38 261 F.Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), afl'd, No. 24301 (5th Cir., March 29, 1968 (here-
inafter cited as Ferrell).
39 The hair styles of appellant students are described in the following excerpt from
the trial court's opinion: ". . . Stephen's hair is over his ears but one can see the
lobe of his ear. It is not over his collar, but is over his forehead and down to his
eyebrows . . ." his (Paul's) hair is about 1 inch over his ears and about 11/2 inches
above his eyebrows ... (Philip's) hair is hanging straight forward, would come be-
low his eyebrows, but is combed and turned to the side so as to be a very shortdistance above his eyebrows. The hair extends down the ear lobe on the side and
to the collar in the back. (These hair styles, adopted by the students, are in con-
formity with the so-called '.'Beatle" hair styles.)
40 Ferrell, supra note 38 at 551.
41 Id. at 552.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 269 F.Supp. 524 (ED. La. 1967).
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no constitutional right, through the Civil Rights Act, to keep his hair
long in direct defiance of reasonable rules and regulations of the school
board acting directly through its superintendent and its principal.46
The facts, in Davis, are typical of most of the cases in this area. Dave
Davis, a fifteen year old boy, was suspended from John F. Kennedy
Senior High School after failing to have his hair cut in conformity with
the principal's instructions. Several conferences between student Davis,
his father, and the school authorities then ensued. Only after he had his
hair cut, some sixteen days later, was Dave Davis finally readmitted
to the high school. The court justified its position by citing Ferrell,
saying:
It is inconceivable that a school administrator could operate his
school successfully if required by the courts to follow the dictates
of the students as to what their appearance shall be, what they
shall wear, what hours they will attend, etc. 47
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District48 is
another case often cited by school authorities. In Tinker, the court up-
held the suspension of students who violated a rule against the wearing
of black arm bands protesting the war in Viet Nam. The court said that
school authorities did not have to wait for an actual disturbance before
they acted to prevent an incident reasonably anticipated; and that this
action by school authorities was not in violation of freedom of speech
as protected under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.49
In essence, the school authorities believe that they have not only
the right but the duty to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations
in order to create a favorable learning atmosphere.
The Students' Contentions
The students, just like the courts, have beliefs as to what consti-
tutes proper dress and appearance regulations. They seem to feel that
education is too important to the person to be granted or denied on the
basis of standards of personal appearance. 50 The contention is that as
long as a student's appearance does not in fact disrupt the educational
process, or constitute a threat to safety, it should not be of any concern
to the school.51
46 Id. at 529.
47 Id. at 528.
48 258 F.Supp. 971 (S.D. Ia. 1966). In upholding the school regulation, the court (on
page 972) said that unless the actions of the school officials in this connection are
unreasonable, the courts should not interfere.
49 Id. at 972.
50 Pamphlet, Academic Freedom in the Secondary Schools, at 19, American Civil
Liberties Union (Sept. 1968).
51 Id.
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In Myers v. Arcata Union High School District52 the court held in
favor of this student view. The court said that regulations made by
school authorities must have some "reasonable connection to school
matters, departments, discipline, etc., or to the health and safety of the
students." 53 In discussing dress regulations as a "discipline," the court
continued:
The court has too high a regard for the school system . . . to think
they are aiming at uniformity or blind conformity as a means of
achieving their stated goal in educating for responsible citizen-
ship.54 (Emphasis added.)
The court's conclusion was that the school should not allow its adminis-
trators' personal preferences to be forced upon others in order to achieve
orderly conduct of school business.55
A ruling by the Commissioner of Education of New York held that
New York schools have no right to bar merely unorthodox school attire
(in this case the wearing of slacks).56 The ruling recognized the school's
power to prohibit wearing of noisy and destructive metal cleats, unduly
restrictive clothing in gym class, and apparel which indecently exposes. 57
This decision would seem to indicate, as one writer recently put it, that
"many educational administrators are far in front of the courts." 58
In Zachry v. Brown,5 9 the court overruled a Jefferson State Junior
College's regulation pertaining to permissible hair styles. The district
court found the regulation was unreasonable and that it failed to "pass
constitutional muster." 60 However, the value of Zachry in future litiga-
tion is probably minimal. Most school authorities defend their actions in
the suspension of long-haired students on the ground that these students
would have a "disruptive influence" on the classroom atmosphere. 61
Yet, no suggestion was made by the school authorities in Zachry that
such haircuts had any effect upon the health, discipline, or decorum of
the institution. 62 In fact, the district judge pointed out in his opinion
52 Supra note 1 at 2.08; Myers v. Arcata Union High School District (Cal. Sup. Ct.
1966).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 2.09.
56 Id. at 2.08, Ruling No. 7594 (March 14, 1964).
57 Id.
58 Supra note 1 at 2.08.
59 In, Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, No. 24301 (5th Cir., March 29,
1968) at 14.
60 Id.
61 Leonard, supra note 26; accord, Ferrell, supra note 38.
62 Ferrell v. Dallas, supra note 59.
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that such regulations were promulgated solely because the school ad-
ministrators disliked what they considered "exotic hair styles." 63
Constitutional Arguments
The plaintiff-students usually place their main emphasis on the
Constitution, in their attack on the interpretations of school dress and
appearance regulations. These arguments usually involve the First,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The students advance the view that by compelling them to cut their
hair the school authorities have infringed their First Amendment right
of freedom of expression.6 4 This argument is based on the view that
choice of a particular hair style is a form of "symbolic expression" akin
to thought and speech, and that such free exercise of thought and speech
is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. To illustrate, the students
cite West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,5 where it was
held that symbolic expression is entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion. In Barnette, the Supreme Court said that the action of a State
in making it compulsory for children in public schools to salute the
flag and pledge allegiance was a violation of the students' First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.66
However, the courts have not been inclined to follow the reasoning
advanced by the students under the "symbolic expression argument." 67
In Davis, the court said that a symbol must stand for a specific concept
or viewpoint; it is just a device by which an idea is transmitted from
person to person.68 Thus, it is meaningless unless it expresses a particu-
lar idea. Hair does not symbolize anything. In rejecting the students'
contentions, the court found that the symbolic method of expressing
loyalty to one's nation, i.e.-saluting a flag-was not analogous to the
wearing of long hair.6 9
Thus, no educator may compel a student to surrender his consti-
tutional rights as a prerequisite for the privilege of attending school.70
The court said, in part:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, pro-
tects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-the
63 Id. at 14.
64 Davis v. Firment, supra note 45.
65 319 U.S. (1942) (hereinafter cited as Barnette).
66 Id. at 642.
67 Davis v. Firment, supra note 45 at 527; accord, Ferrell v. Dallas, supra note 59.
68 Davis v. Firment, supra note 45 at 527.
69 Id.
70 Supra note 50 at 20.
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Board of Education not excepted . . . that they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of consti-
tutional freedom of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles
as mere platitudes. 71
Burnside v. Byars,7 2 is another decision which upholds students'
rights. In Burnside, school officials were attempting to enforce regula-
tions forbidding students from wearing "freedom buttons." These but-
tons contained the wording "One Man, One Vote" around the outside,
with "SNCC" inscribed in the center. The court held that Negro students
wore the buttons as "a means of silently communicating an idea and to
encourage the members of their community to exercise their civil rights."
In finding the high school regulation to be arbitrary and unreasonable,
the court found that there was no evidence of the disruption of school
activities. In dealing further with the First Amendment, the court said:
(School Officials) cannot infringe on their students rights to free an
unrestricted expression as guaranteed to them under the First
Amendment . . . where the exercise of such rights did not ma-
terially and substantially interfere with the requirement of ap-
propriate discipline in the operation of the school.7 3
The court, however, softened its statement when it indicated that there
must be a balancing of First Amendment rights against the duty of the
State to further and protect the public school system. The court recog-
nized the general rule that the school authorities have the right to
adopt and enforce reasonable ridles and regulations which are essential
in maintaining order and discipline on school property.74
In Griswold v. Connecticut7 5 the Supreme Court invalidated a Con-
necticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal of-
fense. The court held that the statute was invalid as an unconstitutional
invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Justice Douglas, in
giving the opinion of the court, pointed out that First Amendment protec-
71 Barnette, supra note 65 at 637.
72 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
73 Id. at 749. However, the same court, on similar facts in Blackwell v. Issaquena
County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) reached the opposite con-
clusion. The case was distinguished from Burnside, on the grounds that here it was
shown that a severe disciplinary problem was caused by the Buttons, i.e., created a
state of confusion, disrupted classes, and resulted in a general breakdown of orderly
discipline.
74 Id. at 748. However, the court (on page 748) said:
But liberty of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment can be abridged
by State officials if their protection of legitimate state interests necessitates an
invasion of free speech.
This statement has often been quoted by advocates of the school's position.
75 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Griswold).
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tion includes more than mere spoken words.70 In fact, Justice Douglas
expressed the view that such protection, afforded by the First Amend-
ment, includes "the freedom of the entire university community." 77
Continuing, Justice Douglas said that these various constitutional guar-
antees, such as the right of association contained in the penumbra of
the First Amendment, the prohibition against quartering of soldiers
under the Third Amendment, the right against unreasonable search
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and the right against self
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, all create "zones of pri-
vacy." 78 In referring to this right of privacy in marriage he said of it
that it is:
a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system.79
Thus, Justice Douglas appears to be suggesting that the right to marital
privacy is only one of the various rights to privacy which the State may
not invade. 0
In a concurring opinion in Griswold, Justice Goldberg asserted that
the Ninth Amendment expressed the desire to give constitutional pro-
tection to other fundamental rights not specifically mentioned in the
Bill of Rights.81 He asserted that the concept of liberty in the Four-
teenth Amendment embraced the marital right to privacy.8 2
Thus, fundamental personal liberties may not be abridged by a
State merely upon the showing that some regulatory statute (i.e.-school
appearance regulation) has some rational relationship to effectuation of
a reasonable state purpose.
. . . Where there is significant encroachment upon personal liberty,
the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest
which is compelling . . . the law must be shown necessary and not
merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible
state policy.83
76 First Amendment protection includes the right to educate one's children as one
chooses (citing) Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510; the right to receive, the
right to distribute, and the right to read, (citing) Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141; freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought and freedom to teach, (citing)
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183.
77 Supra note 75, at 482.
78 Id. at 485.
79 Id. at 486.
80 Does not denying students access to public education, because of their hair-
styling, become a restriction on their personal (i.e.-private) rights to free choice of
grooming which the State has no power to regulate?
81 Griswold, supra note 75 at 492.
82 Id. at 487.
83 Id. at 497.
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Under Griswold, certain fundamental personal rights are protected from
government intrusion. Does this not include the "fundamental personal
choice of hair grooming"?
A Case Study
Legal Issues and resulting litigation are not the only problems cre-
ated by school dress and appearance regulations. The following case is
a good example of how debatable such regulations can be.
In re: Carl Towner
Carl Towner is a fourteen year old boy who had attended North
Olmsted Junior High, in North Olmsted, Ohio. On September 27, 1967,
Everett Seaman, director of pupil personnel for the North Olmsted
Schools, filed a complaint against Carl in Cuyahoga County (Cleveland)
Juvenile Court. The charges stemmed from the fact that Carl had been
"truant" from North Olmsted Junior High since September 19, 1967,
when he had been suspended by principal Charles Sewell; he had re-
fused Mr. Sewell's request that he cut his hair to an "acceptable
length," and had subsequently been suspended.
Carl and his family were British subjects who had moved to the
United States ten years earlier, from London, England, when his father
became president of an American corporation. Eight years before the
court filing, they had moved to North Olmsted. Carl's brother Curt,
who also wore his hair long, was at this time attending another school
in the North Olmsted School System. The policy of the North Olmsted
School District is to allow each individual principal to decide what is
"reasonable" dress and appearance at his particular school.8 4
Carl Towner's delinquency hearing for truancy from school, and the
resulting appeal to the Court of Appeals, is not relevant for our dis-
cussion herein. What is of crucial interest are the issues and problems
created by Carl's suspension."5
First, Curt's hair style was similar to Carl's. Yet, Carl's principal
found his hair style unacceptable while nothing was ever said by Curt's
principal about the way he wore his hair. Thus, even in the same school
system there existed an obvious lack of uniformity of regulations. Are
84 The above facts were obtained by this writer during a newspaper interview with
student Carl Towner, his father Ernest Towner, and a Cleveland Plain Dealer re-porter. The interview was conducted at Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court on Oc-
tober 12, 1967.
85 On October 12, 1967 Juvenile Court Judge John J. Toner adjudged Carl Towner
to be delinquent. Juvenile Court No. 242128. On September 19, 1968, the Court ofAppeals reversed Carl Towner's delinquency charge. The court said that since CarlTowner and his parents did not receive written notice under Sections 3321.19 and3321.22 of the Ohio Revised Code about the ramifications of being truant from
school, Carl was denied due process of law. C.P. 28766 (1968).
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such dress and appearance regulations "fair" to students when two
principals in the same school district cannot agree?
Closely related to uniformity, is the problem of "reasonableness."
Assuming that school systems have the right to set reasonable dress and
appearance regulations, what is a "reasonable hair length" for a four-
teen year old boy? Should the hair be worn one inch down on the
forehead? Two inches? Just above the eyebrows? Over the eyes?
Still another problem brought out by Carl's suspension is the issue
of public interest versus private rights. Phrased differently, the question
may be stated: Is the public interest paramount to the personal rights
of Carl Towner?
Conclusion
In most of the cases dealing with dress and appearance regulations,
the students have been suspended within the first few days of the school
term. Yet, in almost every case the school authorities contend that their
action was necessary for the successful operation of the school; that
without such measures there would be a "disruption" of the proper
classroom atmosphere. This contention, that the presence of long-
haired students surely would be disruptive in the educational setting,
has been accepted by the courts. At no time has there been actual proof
of such adverse effects upon the school system. In fact, does not the
school's own action in attempting to single out such behavior as dis-
ruptive, often create its own disruption? 86
As previously stated, the students advance a strong argument that
the test for such adverse behavior ought to be factual not what the
principal thinks may result.8 7 However, at the present time the burden
to disprove disruptive effect remains on the shoulders of the student.
Such a weight should be placed upon the State, to show that there is
such disruption."8
School authorities usually advance the argument that education is
a "public right." Because of this, they say, the State has a duty to pro-
tect the school system, i.e.-by adopting reasonable rules and regula-
tions for maintaining discipline on school property. One writer, in re-
jecting this theory regarding dress regulations, stated:
Can it be said that long hair on male students carries with it such
a compelling state interest that the State can order it cut as a pre-
requisite to education? What can be said to be the danger to the
86 Ferrell, supra note 38 at 551.
87 See, Burnside v. Byars, supra note 72.
88 N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The case upheld the right to associ-
ate and the right to privacy in one's associations.
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State? And if the State can compel short hair today, it can compel
long hair tomorrows 9
One device for solution of this perplexing problem might be a school
board or panel, composed of both teachers and students. If a student
and a principal disagree over a particular dress and appearance regula-
tion, as arbitrary or unreasonable as to this student, the board could
determine the best solution, thus preventing unnecessary court action.
Then, if no workable agreement could be reached, the student could
still resort to the courts for the proper relief. On the other hand, by
turning the problem over to the board, the principal would guarantee
his support of their solution.
These problems are not at all funny to the younger generation, and
must be worked out, so that our school systems can return to their task
of education. Education is too important a right to be denied or granted
on the basis of shifting standards of personal appearance.90
89 Brief for the Appellants at 4, Davis v. Firment (1967), supra note 45.
90 Supra note 50 at 19.
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